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NOTES
INCOME TAXATION-PROPERTY HELD "PRIMARILY FOR SALE"-
EFFECT OF MALAT v. RIDDELL
The distinction between capital gains and ordinary income
has spawned constant litigation and comment. Due to the con-
siderable benefit of capital gains treatment,1 taxpayers frame
their transactions to qualify for these savings. Capital gains are
derived from the sale of capital assets which are defined by
exclusion in section 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2
Clause one of section 1221 excludes from the category of capital
assets "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business."8
The application of this standard4 to real estate transactions is
the topic of this Note.
The determination of whether property is held primarily
for sale to customers is considered a question of fact.5 Factors
recognized by the courts to bear on its resolution include: (1)
the purpose for which the property was acquired;6 (2) the
frequency and continuity of sales;7 (3) the activity of the seller
in improving and selling the property,s including the extent
of advertising;9 (4) the holding period;10 and (5) other factors
1. The Internal Revenue Code provides for a deduction from gross
income of fifty percent of the excess of net long-term capital gains over
net short-term capital losses. However, in no case may the tax exceed 25
percent of the excess. INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, H§ 1201, 1202.
2. 26 U.S.C. §9 1-8023 (1954).
3. Id. § 1221: "For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'capital asset'
means property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his
trade or business), but does not include-
"(1) ... property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business."
4. The standard also appears in other sections of the Internal Revenue
Code. See 4d. §§ 337(b)(1)(A), 341(b)(3)(B), 1031(a), 1231(b)(1)(B).
5. Lakin v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 781, 783 (4th Cir. 1957); Rollingwood
Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 265 (9th Cir. 1951); George V. Sottong,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366, 1371 (1966); Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C. 704,
708 (1959).
6. Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1952); George V.
Sottong, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366, 1371 (1966).
7. Frank v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 143, 149 (8th Cir. 1963); Rollingwood
Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1951); George V. Sottong,
25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366, 1371 (1966).
8. King v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1951); George V.
Sottong, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1366, 1371 (1966).
9. Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 1967); Delsing v.
United States, 186 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1951).
10. Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 1967).
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indicating that the sale was in the ordinary course of business."
No one of these tests is considered determinative'12 and each
case must be decided in the light of its own facts.18
The interpretation of "primarily" has received recent clari-
fication by the United States Supreme Court in Malat v. Riddell.14
The Court granted certiorari' 5 because of a conflict among the
courts of appeal. The Second 6 and Ninth Circuits adopted the
position of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 8 and the Tax
Court 19 in finding that "primarily" indicated only a "substantial"
or "essential" purpose to hold for sale; while the Fifth2° and
Eighth 2' Circuits restricted the meaning to "of first importance"
or "principally."
In Malat, the taxpayer was a member of a joint venture
which purchased a 45-acre tract and subdivided the interior
portion. The gain from the subdivision sales was taxed as
ordinary income. Confronted with mortgage and zoning prob-
lems which prevented development of two frontage parcels, the
taxpayer sold out his interest in this acreage, claiming the favor-
able capital gains treatment. The Commissioner assessed and
collected a deficiency claiming the property was held with a
"dual purpose" of developing for rental purposes or selling,
whichever proved more profitable. Therefore, the purpose to
sell was a "substantial" one. Mr. Malat contended the property
was held as an investment; sale not being contemplated until
the difficulties were encountered. The district court and the
court of appea 2 2 found one of the "substantial" purposes was
that of sale, and upheld the Commissioner in denying capital
11. Delsing v. United States, 186 F.2d 59, 61 (5th Cir. 1951) (licensed real
estate agent); S. 0. Bynum, 46 T.C. 295, 300 (1966) (significance of time
spent and income from real estate transactions).
12. Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 1967); Recordak
Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 460, 461 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Frankenstein v. Com-
missioner, 272 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1959).
13. Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 1967); Mauldin
v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
14. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
15. Malat v. Riddell, 382 U.S. 900 (1965).
16. American Can Co. v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604, 605 (2d Cir. 1963).
17. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965); Rollingwood Corp. v.
Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1951).
18. See Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir.
1951).
19. Municipal Bond Corp., 41 T.C. 20, 29 (1963); American Can Co.,
37 T.C. 198, 210 (1961); Joseph A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236, 1241 (1958).
20. United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951).
21. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Qommissioner, 341 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir.
1965).
22. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965).
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gains treatment. The Supreme Court redefined "primarily" to,
mean "of first importance" or "principally." It vacated 2 and
remanded the case for disposition under the new definition.24
To understand the significance of this decision and the cases
which have interpreted it, the requirements of the statute must
be divided into the following elements: 25 (1) held "primarily"
for sale, and (2) to customers in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. In other words, the court must find the taxpayer in the
real estate business before it can turn to Malat for the defini-
tion of "primarily held for sale.126
It is here that Malat can be of service to the real estate
dealer. As noted above,27 the Commissioner has in the past been
able to succeed if he could prove a "dual purpose," the inten-
tion to hold for sale being at least a "substantial" one.2 8 The
dealer can now qualify for capital gains treatment by showing
that the primary purpose for owning the asset was not that
of sale.29
The Tax Court was confronted with a post-Malat case in-
volving "dual purpose" in Emilio Olivieri.80 It found the tax-
payer and his partner, real estate developers, were undecided
with respect to the use to be made of the particular tract and
were holding it without taking any action which would commit
them to its development or to retaining it as an investment.
The court held, relying on Malat, that when the property was
sold neither of these purposes had become a principal purpose
or one of first importance; therefore, the property was not being
held "primarily for sale."81
23. It must be remembered that the Supreme Court made no decision on
the facts. Therefore, deciding future cases by comparison of facts as In
Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1967) is improper.
24. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
25. The Tax Court has divided the second element into "for sale to
customers" and "in the ordinary course of business," but considers the
former insignificant because all sales are made to customers. S. 0. Bynum,
46 T.C. 295, 302 (1966) (concurring opinion); Eugene L. Freeland, 25 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1473, 1479 (1966).
26. See Rollingwood Corp. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir.
1951).
27. See notes 16 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
28. Malat v. Riddell, 347 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1965); American Can Co. v.
Commissioner, 317 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1963); Rollingwood Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1951).
29. Comment, Dual Purpose Assets and Capttal Gains, 12 S.D. L. REV.
408 (1967); Supreme Court to clarify dealer's right to capital gain; will rule
in Malat case, 24 J. TAXATION 22 (1966).
30. 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 920 (1966).
31. The court gave a more liberal interpretation of Malat than necessary
to decide the case. The purposes of holding for sale and holding for invest-
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In two other cases, where a "dual purpose" was involved,
the Tax Court originally determined the taxpayer's purpose met
the test of holding with sale as a "substantial" purpose. After
Malat, the court reconsidered these cases and affirmed their
previous decision finding that they could meet the more exacting
test of "principally" laid down by the Supreme Court.8 2
With respect to the second element, sale "to customers in
the ordinary course of business," the Supreme Court decision
has had negligible effect. 88 It is here that equity calls for a
change in the requirements of the Code. With regard to section
1221 (1), the Supreme Court has said:
"The purpose of the statutory provision with which we
deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising
from the everyday operation of a business' on the one
hand.., and the 'realization of appreciation in value accrued
over a substantial period of time' on the other. 8 4
However, in many cases, the statutory standard is unequipped
to make this distinction. In S. 0. Bynum8 5 the taxpayer pur-
chased a farm in 1942 for use in the nursery business. Due to
financial reversals, he was forced to subdivide a part of it in
1959 to meet his obligations. The Tax Court correctly held
under the statute that at the time of sale the property was held
"primarily for sale" and subjected the gain to treatment as
ordinary income. However, the gain resulted from both realized
appreciation and everyday profits, and provision should be made
to divide it between ordinary income and capital gain.86
The Code provides the means for making the necessary dis-
tinction between capital gains and ordinary income in dealing
ment are alternative. The lack of a finding that the property was held
as an investment connotes that the taxpayer has failed to shoulder the
burden of proof In convincing the court that the property was not held
primarily for sale. See TAx CT. R. 32.
32. Municipal Bond Corp., 46 T.C. 219 (1966); Joan E. Heller Trust, 25
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 634 (1966). However, both of these cases were reversed on
appeal because of a seeming reluctance on the part of the Tax Court
to accept the full Import of Malat. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner,
67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9633 (8th Cir. 1967); Joan E. Heller Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 67-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9626 (9th Cir. 1967).
33. Compare Lakin v. Commissioner, 249 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1957), with
L. P. Barney, 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 109 (1967).
34. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966).
35. 46 T.C. 295 (1966).
36. The Internal Revenue Code provides limited relief when the sub-
division development is on a small scale and certain requirements are met.
However, this relief has very limited application. INT. Rsv. CODs oF 1954
§ 1237.
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with cut timber.3 This principle could be easily adapted to the
real property area by treating the appreciation in value of the
property while held as an investment as capital gain, and the
profits made in developing and selling as ordinary income.8
Such a scheme would surely restore equity and certainty in this
much-litigated area.
Leon J. Reymond, Jr.
"OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROVISIONS
Plaintiff and Courville were guest passengers in a vehicle
when it collided with an uninsured automobile. The uninsured
motorist's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The
host's insurer deposited $10,000.00, the policy limit, of which
Courville1 was awarded $5,000.00, the host $2,000.00, and plain-
tiff $3,000.00. Each claimant would have been entitled to a larger
recovery but for the size of the policy limit. Plaintiff then
brought suit against his own insurer, under his policy's un-
insured motorist provisions. Defendant insurer argued that under
the "other insurance" clause in plaintiff's policy 2 its liability
was extinguished by the host's insurer's payment of $3,000.00,
since the uninsured motorist limits of both plaintiff's and the
host's policies were identical. The district court allowed plaintiff
full recovery ($5,000.00) under his policy. Held, amended and
37. The Internal Revenue Code treats the application in value of the
standing timber as capital gain to be considered realized when the timber
is cut, and the profits made in selling the cut timber as ordinary income.
Id. § 631(a).
38. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS
695 (1960); Dakin, The Capital Gains Treasure Chest: Rational Extension or
Expedient Di8tortionf, 14 LA. L. REv. 505, 522 (1954). A similar effect could
be created by the taxpayer by the establishment of another entity to acquire
the property for development if he already holds the land for investment
purposes. Berge, Special Tax Problems of Participants in Real Estate
Developments, 45 TAXES 161, 163 (1967).
1. Courville was denied recovery under his own policy's uninsured
motorist coverage in the companion case of Courville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), writs refused, 197 So.2d
79 (1967).
2. The clause contained the following language: "Other Insurance. With
respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile now
(sic) owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall
apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available
to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit
of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance." LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791, 792 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967).
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